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ABSTRACT 
For the past decades, different economic policies were implemented in order to better the 
Egyptians’ living standards. However when we look at where Egypt stands in terms of quality of 
education and labor efficiency, we realize that those policies did not help as much as we would 
have hoped. With an outlook on these different policies and potential solutions to overcome their 
inefficiencies, the author analyzes a potential starting point which includes working on the 
education sector in order to upgrade the Egyptians’ living standards and hopefully, the growth 
path of the economy. It was found that a simple increase of 20% in the quality of education leads 
to almost double the average growth rate of the country.  
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INTRODUCTION  
“A book has got smell. A new book smells great. An old book smells even better. An old 
book smells like ancient Egypt.”- Ray Bradbury.1 
“Egypt is not a country we live in but a country that lives within us.”- Pope Shenouda III. 
“Egypt is a large, complex, very important country.”- Hillary Clinton. 
The above mentioned quotes do not come close to describing how Egypt came to be one 
of the most talked about countries in many aspects; historically, politically, socially, and 
religiously. Ever since the ancient times of the Pharaohs, Egypt has been the epicenter of 
the world, making history as she goes along. From the ancient empire that arose on her 
lands to the 6
th
 of October 1973 victory and the peace treaty with Israel to the 25
th
 of 
January 2011 revolution, Egyptians never failed to impress and garner the awe of the 
world. Historical events are witnesses on how grand and mysterious she is. Egypt went 
through a lot of changes and conflicts that have changed the shape of the society 
altogether. Most of these changes and conflicts have risen because of the unfortunate 
overall descent of the country and the multi-faceted failures of the state to deal with the 
people’s demands and the country’s many problems.  
After President Hosni Mubarak stepped down on the 11
th
 of February 2011 and 
Egypt entered its transitional path into democracy and a hopeful achievement of a better 
life for her people, a lot of questions and problems have come into the light, most 
importantly its dying economy and the hard fact that Egyptians do not seem to be getting 
the education they need in order to thrive and better themselves. In 2007, 32 per cent of 
the population was completely illiterate and most recently, Egypt has been placed last in 
terms of quality of primary education; i.e., Egypt officially has the worst primary 
                     
1
Quotes are provided byhttp://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/egypt.html. 
 [2] 
 
education system in the world. Even with impressive improvements in the country’s 
infrastructure especially in utilities and telecommunications (an increasing access to 
internet and better telecom services), with an average GDP growth rate of circa 6 per cent 
throughout the new millennium, the overall development of the country is deteriorating. 
For example, Egypt saw its ranking settle among the lower 40 per cent of all developing 
countries in the UN’s 2007 Human Poverty Index. Hence, the reason for the study that I 
conducted presents itself; does the answer to Egypt’s ailing economy lie within its 
educational sector? And if so, how much impact on economic growth could education 
reforms produce? 
The previous literature discusses the relationship between economic growth and 
education including the role of government involvement. Hanushek (2003) mentions that 
a resource-based policy of the government has little effect on the educational sector. He 
argues that the educational attainment of students is almost unaffected by government 
policy. Using U.S. data, he clarifies that an active involvement of government in the 
education sector is deemed as a failure. While Hanushek might strike some important 
points regarding that matter, I argue that the question should not be just about resource 
management in the education sector, but also about the quality of the 
outcomesarisingfrom those resources.   
Basu and Bhattari (2012) ask whether a resource based public education policy 
can be counterproductive. Theyalso explorethe proactive role of the government as a 
factor determining public education spending behavior (across countries), and the 
relationship between public education spending and schooling returns. Glomm and 
Ravikumar (1992, 1997) link public expenditure on education to growth as well as 
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Blankenau and Simpson (2004) and Blankenau, Simpson and Tomljanovich (2007). 
Blankenau and Camera (2009) show that in a strategic environment, when a government 
spends more on the education sector, students may underinvest in their efforts, which 
may dampen any spillover effect on economic growth. 
In this paper, I focus on the quality of the educational system and human capital 
in Egypt. Specifically, the following questions are explored: Has the path to growth and 
development been hindered by an inefficient educational system? What needs to be done 
in terms of improving the quality of education in order for Egypt to have more qualified 
workers? How can “labor and education” work together in order for Egypt to move from 
a developing to a developed country?From the study conducted, I find that despite the 
important illiteracy rate that seems to persist in Egypt, Egyptians spend half of their lives 
educating themselves and building their human capital. However, that time spent on 
education yields little in terms of building the stock of human capital for Egyptians. 
Therefore, any potential the educational system has of contributing positively to 
economic growth is not currently being used effectively.  
To answer these questions, I use an endogenous growth model similar to that used 
in Basu and Bhattari (2012).The model focuses on the relationship between government 
involvement in the educational sector, in terms of spending on education, and the impact 
it has on the productivity of schooling and the average growth rate of the economy. In 
their model, the authors aimed for cross-country results on how government involvement 
in education can negatively affect the average growth rate of the economy. In my 
analysis, I apply their growth model on Egypt and try to establish a positive relationship 
between the quality of education and the average growth rate of the country.  The results 
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that I reach support my hypothesis that increasing the quality of education will in fact 
contribute in increasing the average growth rate of Egypt’s economy by significant 
strides. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I present a briefhistory ofEgypt’s 
economy and where it appears to be going, while also shedding some light on potential 
policy prescriptions that could help resolve the issues mentioned a priori. In Section II, I 
present a simple endogenous growth model, the purpose of whichis to measure how 
effective the educational system in Egypt is. Section IIIconcludes with possible solutions 
for improving the Egyptian educational system so that it can begin to contribute 
positively in the growth of the Egyptian economy. 
 
SECTION I: ECONOMIC POLICIES IN EGYPT 
 This section discusses a brief history of economic growth and reforms in Egypt. 
Under the reign of three presidents, Egypt has seen different economic approaches and 
policies to better the economic situation and turn the country into an economic 
stronghold. The goal is to understand the path of growth to date, as well as to reinforce 
that a poor education system has limited the access to economic growth among the 
country’s poor, even with the different economic policies applied “for their benefit”. 
According to the African Development Bank’s 2012-2013 Interim Strategy Paper: 
Egypt; Egypt is considered to be the second largest economy of Africa and the 25
th
 
globally. The Egyptian economy is known to be well-diversified and driven mainly by 
tourism revenues, oil and gas exports, trade services and agriculture. As of 2011, Egypt’s 
population stands at 83 million with a distinctive characteristic of being poor and having 
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financial hardships. Over the past 50 years or so, the Egyptian economy has seen many 
reforms and policies implemented to restructure and redesign the market to better cope 
with the regional and global markets, as well as cope with the people’s demand of a 
better and improved lifestyle.  
 
A. A POPULIST OUTLOOK: 
 Egypt was known to be one of the “must-watch” countries in terms of economic 
development during the late 50’s to the end of the 60’s. Following the 1952 July coup 
d’état that disposed of the monarchy, the Egyptian economy went through a major 
change, most importantly on the economic side. During Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s 
presidency, the economy was mainly driven by a populist agenda hence, eliminating the 
massive concentration of resources and riches in the hands of the elite capitalists of the 
disposed monarchy.  
 President Nasser’s most important policy was to revolutionize the public sector 
with more state-owned factories and companies being built. By the late 50’s and early 
60’s, Egypt’s most sizeable businesses were nationalized which helped the late 
president’s economic vision at that time; to remodel the structure of wealth by 
transferring ownership from a narrow strata of capitalists to the poorer and ordinary 
people. This direction brought on a more balanced socio-economic status to the society. 
The social curve eventually flattened, aided by a dramatic increase in university 
education, expansion in industry and services, as well as an emerging public sector. As a 
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result, the previously poorer strata of Egyptians moved up to the middle class
2
. He was 
able to transform Egypt’s society from a poor and helpless society into a working and 
driven one.  
 The results were staggering; the country’s economy grew at an average of 9% per 
year for almost a decade. The manufacturing contribution to the GDP increased from 
14% to 35%
3
 in the early 70’s. The aforementioned sector became the largest employer 
of Egyptians making Egypt a country with a very large share of labor force in the 
manufacturing sector. Unemployment decreased from 2.7% in 1960 to 1.15%
4
 in 1966, a 
record low. This is was due to the rapid growth of the public sector after nationalizing 
most of the companies and factories and to the increasing number of graduate students 
because of the expansion of free education.    
  The newly empowered public sector was not accompanied by proper training and 
skill enhancement to the poor, low skilled farmers that came to acquire a larger portion of 
the agriculture resources from the more educated and well-capitalized landowners 
(following the President’s land reform act). That resulted in a poorer quality of agrarian 
produce and poor marketing for it (especially the cotton which is Egypt’s main 
agriculture produce) i.e. a poorer labor productivity and effectiveness.  
 
B. OPENING UP THE ECONOMY: 
Following Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s reign, the late President Mohamed Anwar Al-
                     
2
 The nature of one’s job replaced the landownership in determining one’s social class. The middle class 
swelled and increased with doctors, engineers, teachers, lawyers and journalists being the main jobs 
occupied by the middle class.  
3
(Osman, 2011) 
4
(Osman, 2011) 
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Sadate ushered in a new economic agenda, one that depended on the alliance between 
politics and economics. The economic changes expected from the opening-up policy 
were to transfer power from the state, the government, the military establishment and the 
public sector to a newly emerging private sector. One of the major impacts of the “al-
infitah” policy was on the social aspect. The middle class saw its structure transform 
under the pressure of different forces of change such as the rise of the private sector and 
the increase of Foreign Domestic Investments (FDI). With those effects in play, the 
public sector saw its role decline in the 70’s and 80’s with substantial income gaps 
between workers of both sectors. The opening-up policy adopted at that time created a 
new wave of financial liberalization for the Egyptian economy. It upgraded the country’s 
job market, created a momentum and triggered an increase in a number of industries. The 
private sector became the leading economic player in the country for the three following 
decades, pushing aside the decaying role of the public sector. With the new “opening-up” 
policy set in motion, the average growth rate during El Sadate’s reign ranged around 8% 
as opposed to an average growth rate of almost 5% during Abdel-Nasser’s presidency5. 
However, because of the sizeable income gap between the decaying public sector and 
newly emerging private sector, the former’s top talent and elite university graduates 
moved to much better paying jobs, leaving a vacancy that was hard to help better the 
public sector. Millions comprising Egypt’s middle class, found themselves stuck in that 
sector since the focus of the regime was directed at the private sector. The public sector 
was left stuck with an increasing marginalization and stagnancy and low wages. Despite 
the previous, the public sector remained the backbone of the economy up until the early 
                     
5
 Average growth rate of GDP per capita calculated over a period of 5 years from figures 2 and 3 
respectively.  
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2000’s. With the Egyptian economy opening up to the labor market as well, more than 3 
million Egyptians were lured to work in Gulf States following the first oil boom between 
1974 and 1985. The resulting social mobility in that period was not due to an overall 
socio-economic equality or higher education and professional standing like Nasser’s 
policies. This mobility was supported by an increase in domestic purchasing power. The 
middle class in Egypt was now defined as a function of the disposable income of families 
and no longer by education or professions.  
With that being said, it is important to mention that having the middle class status in 
the economy be determined as a function of the disposable income, rendered it vulnerable 
to the new economic forces in play. “Al-infitah” caused immense pressure on the middle 
classwhere the middle class saw its purchasing power eroded, with real-wages in the 
public sector being affected by high inflation. The newly adopted policy was not flexible 
enough to respond to the social dynamics of the time. With the sudden surge of new 
economic opportunities and an upgrade of the country’s job market, the skills of the 
Egyptian middle class were mismatched with the period’s skill demands and 
requirements.   
 
 
C. FALSE HOPE FOR DEVELOPMENT: 
Mubarak was able to turn the economy into a different version of itself. The 
economic reform the young president then wanted to adopt focused on strengthening and 
solidifying the country’s economic foundations so as to have change come in in a less 
disruptive manner. With the improvement of the people’s economic conditions in mind, 
Mubarak launched a programme of structural adjustments with the help of the World 
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Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He wanted to improve living 
conditions, expand high-employment sectors and decrease poverty through enhancing the 
sources of foreign currency, most importantly the tourism sector (with almost 1.5 million 
Egyptians working in the sector by 2007, representing 4.3% of total GDP and 
accommodating 10% of the workforce.
6
).  
As a result, labor force participation increased following the flow of FDI in the 
country, especially in the tourism sector and a combined effect from the industry and 
services sector (that includes the telecoms sector) (see figures 6, 7, and8). Despite the 
trend of employment in the industrial sector is lower than the one in the services sector, 
its contribution to the employment of the Egyptians is not negligible, reaching as high as 
25% of total employment in 2011.  Following the restructuring of the economy’s 
infrastructure and an important flow of FDI in the 2000’s, the employment trend in the 
services sector grew tremendously, pushing it to become the highest employment sector 
between 2001 and 2005. Despite its decline during 2010/2011, the services sector still 
contributed to about 45% of the employment in the country.Following the ambitious 
restructuring of the economy, unemployment and inflation reached all-time highs during 
Mubarak’s presidency. At a rate of 18-21% in the 25-54 age group, unemployment 
attacked the country’s core labor force (and is still in the double digits following the 
revolution and instability the country is witnessing). This came to affect a sizable section 
of the middle class’s living standards. 
WHAT WENT WRONG? 
 
In my opinion, the main problem plaguing the economy is the lack of consistency 
                     
6
(Osman, 2011) 
 [10] 
 
between the different policies applied.With every regime that came to power in Egypt 
since the monarchy was overthrown, there has been no uniformity in terms of views and 
perceptions of the essential changes needed, or even an idea of what the alternative model 
should be in order to develop Egypt’s economy. The common mistake committed by the 
aforementioned policies wastheir ignoring of the fact that the Egyptian society and 
average workers were still unequipped with the necessary skills and tools to compete in a 
global and more open market, and become more effective and productive as workers. 
Interestingly enough, out of 22 million workers, 42% are either illiterate or 
semiliterate. This has led to the Global Competitiveness Index to classify the Egyptian 
workers as “working poor”, not only because of the stagnation of real wages in the public 
sector over three decades, but because Egyptians have the lowest level of productivity. 
Egypt has been ranked 141/142 in terms of labor market efficiency.
7
 Egyptians were 
considered “unemployable” due to their lacking skills domestically and internationally. 
Following the new “opening-up” policy and the rapid implementation of the socialist 
policy, the Egyptians were in no way prepared to face a competitive and demanding 
global market with new technology and demanding skills. Enhancing the Egyptians’ 
skills should have been the number one objective for both policies, to match up with their 
agenda of propelling the economy forward.  
Following what has been mentioned above, the perfect remedy for the ailing economy 
lies within the educational system of the country. Over the past 60 years, the skills and 
tools acquired by the Egyptian workers have not been sufficient to increase their 
productivity and value in the market. Education refers to not only schools and 
universities, but also to training and enhancing the Egyptians’ set of skills so they are 
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more able to compete and produce on the labor market.In the last Global Competitiveness 
Index of 2013, Egypt was placed last (148
th
 place) in terms of quality of primary 
education. The Adequacy of Education Index has Egypt placed 110/182.
8
 Even if 
Egyptian workers enhanced their skills, they would be given unnecessary skills and 
sometimes unrelated to the labor market demands rendering them unable to work with 
what they have. Educational policies thus far have only served in expanding or 
minimizing the educational system i.e., increasing or decreasing the number of years of 
schooling. They have not served the economic growth and failed to link what the youth 
acquire during their “student” life to what they will face in the labor market.  
   
SECTION II: A MODEL TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM? 
 In this section, I attempt to quantify the major defect that has affected Egypt’s 
educational system: lack of quality. “Quality” is an ambiguous indicator and difficult to 
measure seeing as how the word itself expands over a wide spectrum of definitions. In 
my opinion, the education sector has a great potential in contributing to the growth rate of 
the Egyptian economy. It is my belief that if properly developed and reformed, the 
education sector could have a positive spillover effect, mainly on employment. I use the 
model to determine the level of productivity provided by the present educational system 
and try to establish a link between the quality of education and the growth rate of the 
economy. If a positive relationship exists, I can thenexamine how much the growth rate 
changes given a change in the productivity of education.  
I acquired data on the percentage share of education in the Egyptian GDP from 
the Egyptian Government Finance Statistics (GFS) over the period of 1990 to 2012. I also 
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acquired data on the annual growth rate of GDP from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) over the same period. These two data sets help determine whether there exists a 
link between the quality of education, the share of education in GDP and the annual 
growth rate of the economy. 
 
THE MODEL: 
 My analysis utilizes the model of Basu and Bhattari (2012). Their paper discusses 
the relationship between government involvement in education and the growth rate of the 
economy. The economy has two major sectors: the goods producing sector and an 
education sector. There is a fixed time allocated between schooling and producing goods 
such that 𝑙𝐻𝑡  is time allocated to schooling (i.e. time spent on education) at date 𝑡.Time 
allocated to schooling contributes to an individual’s stock of human capital in the next 
period, denoted by ℎ𝑡+1. Specifically, the law of motion for human capital follows, 
ℎ𝑡+1 =  1 − 𝛿ℎ ℎ𝑡 + 𝐴𝐻𝑔𝑡
𝜂
(𝑙𝐻ℎ𝑡)
1−𝜂  
The previous equation represents the human capital production function,where 𝛿ℎ ∈
 0,1  is the depreciation rate of human capital and 𝜂 ∈  0,1  is a schooling technology 
parameter. Public spending on education is denoted by 𝑔𝑡 , while 𝑙𝐻ℎ𝑡  represents private 
spending on education; i.e., the time spent on education by the households given a level 
of pre-acquired human capital. It is also the opportunity cost of diverting time from goods 
production to human capital production.  
 It is important to mention that the productivity of the schooling input depends on 
two factors:- 
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(i) 𝐴𝐻is the education productivity parameter, or in the context of my paper,the 
quality of the education in Egypt. This particular parameter helps determine 
how much additional human capital the Egyptians get for an additional input 
of schooling time. 
(ii) Public spending on education,𝑔𝑡 , represents the second factor affecting the 
productivity of the schooling input in terms of how much the government 
spends on the educational infrastructure. 
(iii) Another important parameter for my analysis (as well as it was for Basu and 
Bhattari), is 𝜂, which represents the infrastructural role of the government in 
the education sector. In other words, it represents aschooling technology 
parameter and determines how involved the government was in the past in the 
education sector. Basu and Bhattari (2012) call it the government bias in 
education. This parameter represents the tying point in the relationship 
between public spending on education and the growth rate of the economy. 
The final goods,𝑦𝑡 , are produced using a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝐺𝑘𝑡
𝛼(𝑙𝐺𝑡ℎ𝑡)
1−𝛼 ; 𝑙𝐺𝑡  is simply1 − 𝑙𝐻𝑡 , which the time allocated for the production 
of goods in the economy and 𝐴𝐺  is total factor productivity (TFP) which is assumed to be 
constant. The investment goods technology is defined as follows: 𝑘𝑡+1 =  1 − 𝛿𝑘 𝑘𝑡 +
𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ; where 𝛿𝑘  ∈  0,1  is the rate of depreciation of the physical capital.  
The government finances education spending,𝑔𝑡 ,by imposing a proportional tax rate, 
denoted by𝜏𝑡 , on 𝑦𝑡 . The government thus faces the budget constraint:- 
𝑔𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡𝑦𝑡  
 A representative household takes the sequence of tax rates {𝜏𝑡} as given and 
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chooses the sequences of {𝑐𝑡},  𝑖𝑡  and  𝑙𝐻𝑡  that maximize expected lifetime utility:- 
max 𝛽𝑡 ln 𝑐𝑡 
∞
𝑡=0
 
Such that :  𝑐𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑘 =  1 − 𝜏𝑡 𝑦𝑡  (Flow budget constraint) 
ℎ𝑡+1 =  1 − 𝛿ℎ ℎ𝑡 + 𝐴𝐻𝑔𝑡
𝜂
(𝑙𝐻ℎ𝑡)
1−𝜂  (Schooling technology) 
Given an optimal behavior by the private sector, the government sets tax rates  𝜏𝑡  such 
that they maximize the social welfare. 
 Following in the footsteps of Basu and Bhattari, I proceed by defining the 
balanced growth path of the Egyptian economy. Since I focuson 23 years of education 
spending and growth from 1990 to 2012, displaying the balanced growth path of the 
economy allows me to look at the long-run relationship between public education 
spending and the growth rate, cetris paribus. The balanced growth path is characterized 
by the following equations. First, 
𝜏 =  
1−𝛼
1−𝜂
.
𝜂𝑙𝐻
𝑙𝐺
1 +
1−𝛼
1−𝜂
.
𝜂𝑙𝐻
𝑙𝐺
=  
𝑔
𝑦
 
This represents the welfare maximizing steady state government spending on education 
as a share in GDP. The gross balanced growth rate of GDPis given by:- 
𝛾 = 1 − 𝛿ℎ + 𝐴𝐻𝜏
𝜂 𝑙𝐻
1−𝜂𝐴𝐺
𝜂 𝑙𝐺
 1−𝛼 𝜂(
𝑘
ℎ
)𝛼𝜂  
Three expressions are worth mentioning;
9
 
(i) 𝑘 ℎ is the physical to human capital ratio and could be expressed as follows:- 
                     
9
For more details on how we derived the physical to human capital, output to physical capital and output 
to human capital ratios, please check Appendix.  
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𝑘
ℎ = [
𝑦
𝑘
𝐴𝐺(𝑙𝐺)1−𝛼
]
1
1−𝛼  
(ii) The second expression that is important to my analysis is 
𝑦
𝑘  ; which is the 
output to physical capital ratio. It can also expressed as follows:- 
𝑦
𝑘 =  
𝛾
𝛽 −  1 − 𝛿𝑘 
 1 − 𝜏 𝛼
 
(iii) The third expression represents the output to human capital ratio 
𝑦
ℎ which is 
expressed as:-  
𝑦
ℎ = 𝐴𝐺[(1 − 𝑙𝐻)
1−𝛼(𝑘 ℎ )
𝛼] 
MODEL CALIBRATION: 
The goal of this section is to calibrate the values of several key parameters related 
to the educational sector, namely 𝐴𝐻 , 𝜂,and 𝑙𝐻. First, several of the model’s structural 
parameters are fixed at baseline levels. The capital share parameter 𝛼 is set at 0.36 while 
the rate of physical capital depreciation 𝛿𝑘  is at 0.1 as per Prescott (1986). The discount 
factor 𝛽 is set at 0.94 and 𝐴𝐺 , or TFP, is fixed at 3.9 (the value used in (Basu & Bhattari, 
2012)). The rate of human capital depreciation 𝛿ℎ  is equal to 0.05. The following table 
summarizes the previous expressions. 
 
Table 1Baseline Parameters. 
𝛼 𝛽 𝛿𝑘  𝛿ℎ  𝐴𝐺  
0.36 0.94 0.1 0.05 3.9 
  
Contrary to Basu and Bhattari’s approach, I need to identify the values of 𝐴𝐻 and 
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𝑙𝐻 for Egypt alone, rather than having to study a cross-country distribution. Using the 
four previously mentioned equations, I solve for these four unknowns, 𝐴𝐻 , 𝜂, 𝑙𝐻and 
𝑦
𝑘 . 
That is, given the observed growth rate of GDP, 𝛾, and the observed ratio of government 
spending to GDP, 𝜏, the four equations can be solved for the aforementioned four 
unknowns. 
 
Thus𝛾 and 𝜏 represent two important moments in the data. According to the data 
available on Egypt, the average growth rate of GDP between 1990 and 2012 (the range of 
the sample acquired) is equal to  1 + 𝛾 which is 1.0249. Egypt’s education share in GDP 
on average over the same period is equal to 4.5%.  
RESULTS: 
 With the given parameters and information that I was able to gather on Egypt’s 
education spending share in GDP and growth rate over 1990-2012, I was able to identify 
a specific 𝐴𝐻  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝐻 as follows:- 
Table 2Parameters of the Egyptian case. 
𝜂 𝐴𝐻  𝑙𝐻  
0.0694 0.1575 0.4967 
 
The results obtained coincide with the reality of the educational sector in Egypt. 
The government bias to education is high enough to actually mirror the country’s recent 
attention to “improving” education especially since the 2000’s. The education 
productivity parameter 𝐴𝐻  or the quality of the education stands at a low rate of almost 
0.16. Think of human capital as a swimming pool being filled with a hydro pump. If the 
hydro pump is of a good quality and effective, the additional hour of working that pump 
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is worth that hour spent filling up the pool. Applying this analogy to the Egyptian 
situation, we find that an additional hour of education adds relatively little to the 
Egyptians’ overall stock of human capital.  
 
However, when we look at the time Egyptians put into their education 
𝑙𝐻, we can establish that approximately half of their “time” is dedicated to educating 
themselves. With an important weight given to education by the government, a relatively 
high level of effort going towards human capital investment and a low productivity of 
schooling, one cannot help but think that all the recent investments done in the 
educational sector are going to waste.  
Given these calibrated parameters, how does Egypt compare to the rest of the 
world? I compare the results I obtained to the cross-country average calculated by Basu 
and Bhattari (2012) first.  
 
Table 3Comparison between cross-country average distribution and Egypt's parameters. 
𝜂𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑙𝐻,𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒   𝐴𝐻,𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝜂𝐸𝑔𝑦𝑝𝑡  𝑙𝐻,𝐸𝑔𝑦𝑝𝑡  𝐴𝐻,𝐸𝑔𝑦𝑝𝑡  
0.07 0.47 0.15 0.0694 0.4967 0.1575 
Source: Basu and Bhattari (2012) 
 
I find that Egypt is actually quite close to the cross-country average. Its government bias 
to education is slightly less than the average value however; the time allocated to 
education is higher with a value of approximately 0.5 for Egypt and 0.47 for the cross-
country average. As for the quality of schooling, I find that the difference between both 
values is almost negligible with Egypt’s productivity parameter standing at 
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approximately 0.16 and the cross-country average standing at 0.15.  
 As for where Egypt stands among the different regions of the world, the following 
can be established:- 
 
 
Table 4Egypt's stat compared to world's regions. 
Regions Egypt Europe Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Mideast 
and 
North 
Africa 
Asia OECD North 
America 
South 
Asia 
Africa 
𝜂 0.0694 0.078 0.068 0.063 0.057 0.08 0.096 0.036 0.077 
𝑔 (%) 2.49 2.111 1.478 1.518 2.830 2.259 1.756 3.811 0.731 
Source: Basu and Bhattari (2012). 
 
Using Basu and Bhattari’s results (2012) as reference, I can identify Egypt’s stance in 
accordance to the other regions in the world. Hitting close to home, Egypt has a slightly 
higher government bias for education that the Mideast and North African region, but it 
has a higher average growth rate.The Mideast and North Africa have an average growth 
rate of 1.518% over the period 1980-2008, while Egypt observing an average growth rate 
of almost 2.49% over the period 1990-2012.  
 This is where one important limitation to my study makes its appearance; the 
sample period that I examine falls short by 12 years from Basu and Bhattari’s sample 
period of 1980-2008. The reason behind my choice of that sample period is the dilemma 
of missing data on education in Egypt prior to 1990. The 1990-2012 sample period that I 
examine was the most coherent and complete data set I was able to collect. If ever the 
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sample periods were the same, the government bias in education and average growth rate 
in Egypt would most likely either converge to the same numbers as the Mideast and 
North Africa regions, or turn out to be slightly higher.    
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN QUALITY OF EDUCATION AND GROWTH 
RATE? 
 After getting the parameters describing the state of education in Egypt, I 
proceeded with establishing a relationship between the quality of education (𝐴𝐻) and the 
average growth rate of the economy (𝛾). The purpose of this experiment would be to test 
whether or not an increase in the quality of education will have an impact on the average 
growth rate of the Egyptian economy, given everything else constant. Moreover, the 
balanced growth path defined above determines two optimal responses to this structural 
change: (i) the optimal response of households in 𝑙ℎ  and (ii) the optimal response of the 
government in adjusting the welfare maximizing level of government spending on 
education, i.e. 𝜏. 
 
The experiment fixes the government bias for education (𝜂)at the country-specific level 
of 0.0694. I then proceed with increasing the parameter 𝐴𝐻 by 20%, 40% and 60%. These 
increases should have an impact on the time spent on education (𝑙𝐻), the education 
spending share as a % in GDP (𝜏) and of course, the average growth rate of the economy 
(𝛾). The following results were found:- 
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Table 5Changes in parameters as a result of increases in quality of education. 
Increase in 𝑨𝑯 20% 40% 60% 
𝒍𝑯 0.5575 0.6014 0.6343 
𝝉 (%) 5.68 6.72 7.65 
𝜸 (%) 5.02 7.54 10.04 
 
 As shown from the table above, an increase in the quality of education has a 
positive and significant effect on all the parameters related to education. By increasing 
the education from its initial level of almost 16% to 60%, the number of hours spent on 
education jumps from 0.4967 to 0.6343, an increase of almost 28%. To accommodate 
that 60% increase in quality of education, the government has to increase its spending on 
education (as a % share of GDP) from 4.5% to almost 8%. But the most important result 
of all is the positive effect the increase of 𝐴𝐻has on the average growth rate. By 
increasing the quality of education by 60%, the average growth rate jumps from 2.49% to 
10.04%, an increase of almost 303%, 4 times the average growth rate!  
 
SECTION III: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
 Egypt has undergone a lot of economic policies that contributed in shaping the 
Egypt we know today. From a socialist/populist outlook on the economy to an open free 
market, one can only say that the system Egyptians are dealing with is nothing short of a 
“Frankenstein”, a hybrid of different policies that lack consistency, continuity and 
coherence. It is because of the latter reason that we find Egyptians struggling to improve 
their socio-economic status. They’re facing a high level of unemployment (with 18-21% 
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unemployed among the under-25 and with university degrees), a high level of poverty 
(with 20% of the population below the absolute poverty line), complications with 
receiving high quality medical care to tend to their needs, and above all, a poor quality of 
education that leaves them unprepared for the requirements of the global and domestic 
job market.
10
 
 One of the most important sectors that could actually help alleviate some of the 
pressure off of the average Egyptian is education. By education, I not only refer to the 
schooling system and universities but also include training and skill enhancement 
programs to arm the workers with the required and necessary set of skills needed to 
compete in the domestic and global labor markets. It goes without saying that the quality 
of education in Egypt is very low hence, Egyptians have a very low rate of return on 
education. By using Basu and Bhattari’s economic growth model, I was able to establish 
a relationship between quality of education and average growth rate of the Egyptian 
economy.  
It was shown that by increasing the quality of education, average growth rate will 
significantly increase; a 20% increase in the quality of education will lead to an increase 
of almost 102% in terms of average growth rate!However important these results are in 
linking the quality of education to the growth rate of the economy, they appear very much 
unbelievable and stand on their own without taking into consideration other factors and 
sectors in the economy. The results shown above are meant to display how vital an 
educational reform in Egypt is and how, if properly reformed and the quality of the 
education provided improved, could contribute positively to the growth rate of the 
economy. The analysis in this paper determines the impact of an exogenous increase in 
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the “productivity” of the education sector. Given this change, the model determines the 
welfare maximizing response in government spending on education. This welfare 
maximizing level internalizes the opportunity cost of the increased taxes associated with 
more government spending. That said; the exogenous increase in 𝐴𝐻ignores what 
resources may be required to achieve this change. While difficult to quantify, this one 
time increase in resource use may not be negligible. Therefore, it is advisable that future 
research expand in order to include other sectors in the Egyptian economy that might help 
put the effect of the increase in educational production on the growth rate into a more 
focused perspective.For now, the question is; how should the government proceed with 
such a result? 
Investments in the educational sector (whether private or public) should be well 
targeted and aimed at improving the quality of school facilities and not just increase their 
numbers. (Loveluck, 2012)mentions that state-schools in Egypt lack playgrounds, music 
programs, art rooms and even laboratories; they are very rare and even if one crosses 
paths with such facilities, they are in very poor shape. Instead of just increasing their 
numbers, resources should also be directed at increasing the facilities’ quality in order to 
create a conductive educative environment. For example, more equipped laboratories 
with the necessary tools to help with certain subjects, mainly the sciences.  
Another way to increase the quality of education would be to eliminate the concept of 
“overcrowding”. The ratio of students to teachers stands at 40-50:1, which represents a 
great burden on the teacher who receives a salary of US$281/month (1,600 
EGP/month)
11
. We find that some teachers – if not all of them – take on a second and 
even a third job to cover their necessities and be able to live comfortably (especially with 
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a high inflation rate in the economy). This tends to overwork the teachers and increases 
the likelihood of poor performancein class. Some economists and experts suggest that the 
main outlook of any educational policy should be on the schooling quality and 
recognizing the importance of cognitive skills.
12
  It does not just lie in expanding the 
educational system because if the quality remains the same, then any expansion is 
nothing but a waste of investments and efforts. Possible solutionsare various. First, to 
help reform education and in turn, advance with the labor market, a qualitative 
transformation of the institutional framework behind the educational system in Egypt 
should take place. By quality, I refer to the quality of the curriculum presented to the 
students, the method of teaching and the cadre of professors and teachers available, and 
how the students in both schools and universities are able to acquire the skills needed to 
face the labor market i.e., link education to labor.  
 One other possible solution could be to revise Egypt’s Labor Law of 2003 and set 
up an autonomous institution responsible for capacity building throughout Egypt. More 
investments should be directed to improving technical and vocational education and 
training. If properly reformed and maintained, on a short and long run basis, 
employability will improve dramatically and have workers better skilled and trained. 
However, I cannot stress enough of how important it is to reform the schooling process 
and the way students in Egypt are being taught. The system is one that depends on the 
ability of the students to cram for exams and neglects their ability to analyze, think 
strategically and logically and create. The students’ purpose is to get high enough grades 
to go to one of the ivy leagues in Egypt because “it is the social decorum”. Technical 
schools are ignored completely although they have the potential of generating high levels 
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of employment and talents.  
What we lack in Egypt in terms of education is the vision of developing the 
youth’s abilities and skills, to make them think and analyze, to relate what they are 
studying to the real life. Education is all about developing a decent and worthy character 
in the youth rather than developing their ability to cram subjects that will eventually leave 
them unprepared for the real world.  
 In short, reforming the education correctly will create a ripple effect that will 
affect the labor market which in turn will have an impact on poverty and inequality. 
Eventually, growth will be induced and sustained as long as correct education is 
implemented.      
In order to compensate their poor wages, some of the teachers take on private tutoring 
and according to CAPMAS (Egypt’s Central Statistics and Mobilization Agency), over 
60% of private investments in education (the households’ resources) go to private 
tutoring.
13
 The latter has a very negative effect on those students who don’t have the 
capacity to pay for these private lessons, in that the teachers themselves tend to go over 
the material very lightly and superficially so that students would be encouraged to attend 
these private lessons.  
One way to eliminate that loss of resources and better the educative process is to (i) 
reduce the strain on the teachers with a class capacity of max 20-25 per teacher, (ii) 
provide incentive to teachers in order to better focus on their work inside the classroom 
by increasing the salary based on performance evaluation. Government and third party 
personal monitor the professors a few times each semester and write a report detailing 
their in-class work, and (iii) the government should provide high quality training for the 
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teacher in order to eliminate the “unqualified teachers” dilemma. 
Some accuse the government of having a tight centralized control over the curriculum 
across the country. By “centralized control”, I mean that the Ministry of Education 
provides state schools with specific lesson plans and controls the curriculum: what should 
be included in the material and what shouldn’t, what the students should be exposed to 
and what they shouldn’t know. This is done by having government officials visit the 
classrooms and observe the teachers’ in-class time. This gives the teachers a very tight 
space in which they can teach; they cannot go beyond what the material states.  
One way to overcome that obstacle would be to have the Ministry of Education 
loosen the grip on how and what should be taught and focus more on how it should be 
handled by the teachers.The Ministry should allow the teachers to cover the material in 
the best way they see fit in order to develop the students’ skills, knowledge and way of 
thinking. Curriculums should be provided by the schools and not by the Ministry as a 
way to avoid politicizing the content (like when it occurred during Mubarak’s reign and 
post-2011 where exams had a compulsory exam question where students had to thank the 
Supreme Council of Armed Forces on its efforts).  
Learning in Egypt has become all about examinations and focus entirely on how high 
up a student can get in terms of grade points. That being said, pedagogical methods and 
approaches have come to be shaped around helping the students memorize and cram as 
much information as they can in order to exactly reproduce that information during 
exams. Critical thinking, logic analysis, understanding and creativity become a needless 
luxury in the eyes of the students. Following this track, we can notice that high degrees of 
concentration and effort are pooled into getting “overrated” grades in the National 
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Examinations (surpassing the 100% at times) in order to get admitted into Egypt’s Ivy 
League faculties who require at some times, a minimum of 98% to be admitted (without 
further requirement such as language skills). Such faculties include the Faculty of 
Engineering, Medicine and Pharmacy who have become the main target for any student. 
The rest of the branches are shunned out especially the technical colleges and vocational 
training.  
Those who fail in being admitted in those high-tier schools face the poor funded, low 
quality technical colleges where the students face a future of low status. Possible 
solutions to solve the above mentioned dilemma would be to:- 
(i) Shift the focus from solely getting high grades to actually understanding the 
material at hand and developing one’s skills that will serve in the labor 
market later on. Exams have become the key determinant of students’ future 
tracks. Instead, each faculty and university should have an admission test that 
doesn’t depend on the students’ performance during the National 
Examinations. These admission tests would test the students’ skills on critical 
and logical thinking, language, ability to analyze and produce ideas instead of 
reproducing them. 
(ii) Technical colleges and vocational training are just as important as any other 
faculty or university in Egypt. Resources should be focused on improving the 
quality of education in those colleges, and increasing their funding instead of 
just focusing on the prestigious universities (where only a small % of the 
students end up actually working in their respective fields because of high 
supply and low demand in engineering and medicine in the country.) 
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Ever since President Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s socialist policy, education has been 
accessible to all Egyptians, from schools up to higher education. While that may have 
been an important move in his economical/political agenda, a free access to education has 
caused a huge burden on the National Accounts of the country. Instead of having a free 
access to education in all its stages, free access to education should be admissible up till 
6
th
 grade (the end of the primary cycle). Afterwards, up to the 12
th
 grade (the end of the 
secondary cycle); the government covers only a part of the expenses (half-subsidies). 
However, university access should not be permitted to all. At this point, equal attention 
should be given to prestigious schools and technical ones. Students with special skills, 
who excelled in their national examinations and were able to secure a spot in any school 
(whether it be a scientific or technical one) is eligible for a government backed grant or 
scholarship. Private scholarships are also encouraged to alleviate the pressure from the 
government. In the spirit of relating the educative process to the labor markets, faculties 
and schools of different genres should be encouraged to apply a “Co-Op” program as a 
way for students to cover a part of their educational expenses and gain experience 
working in the field of their study.   
Having discussed the possible ways of reforms and the benefits that could come out 
of it, it is only right to mention the costs mirroring those benefits:- 
o Training the teachers to become more effective and productive will most 
certainly demand a reallocation of the government’s resources and a review 
of its national budget to incorporate such trainings effectively. Increasing 
taxes is one way the government could respond to such a reform. To 
determine the welfare maximizing tax rate that could incorporate these 
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training costs, an extension of the model used in this paper could be possible 
since the tax rate is already incorporated. It is also possible to relate the tax 
rate the Egyptian government wishes to apply to an effective level of 
education spending in GDP i.e., the government should reallocate its 
resources in a manner to support a certain level of education spending that 
should match the tax rate as well as the level of quality needed to be reached. 
This could also be a very useful extension to this paper. 
o Decreasing the subsidies on education could also be met by an increase in 
school tuition fees and with higher taxes perceived in the future of this 
reform, if not handled effectively and in a welfare maximizing way, the 
reform could backfire with poorer families taking their children out of school 
given the high costs they will incur.  
o Decreasing the student-teacher ratio will require a more deepened and heavy 
infrastructure to support that decrease. Seeing as how the numbers of students 
in Egypt are huge, more schools and classes could be needed to support that 
cut and even, several school shifts which is already a norm in governmental 
schools. Aside the fact that this will be a burden on the government’s budget, 
the productivity level of one teacher will decrease as the shifts pass by and if 
there are several other teachers teaching the same subject and covering the 
different shifts in the school day, this will mean more wages and therefore, an 
increase in costs.   
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APPENDIX: 
 Figure 1: The labor force participation following Mubarak's restructuring of 
the economy. (Source: World Development Indicators) 
 Figure 2: The employment rate in the services sector. (Source: World 
Development Indicators) 
 Figure 3: The employment rate in industry. (Source: World Development 
Indicators) 
 Figure 4: GDP growth rate during Mubarak's reign. 
 Figure 5: Unemployment rates during the 1990's and 2000's. 
 Figure 6: Correlation between education spending as a share of GDP and GDP 
growth rate. 
 Figure 7: Education spending share as a percentage in GDP. 
 
 
 [32] 
 
  
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure2 
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009
Labor force participation rate, total (% of total 
population, ages 15-64)
Labor force 
participation rate, total 
(% of total population 
ages 15-64)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Employment in services (% of total employment)
Employment in 
services (% of total 
employment)
Linear trendline of 
employment in sector
 [33] 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
Figure 4It can be seen that throughout the 2000’s, the country has seen an impressive growth rate of the 
economy reaching up to 7.2% in 2007/2008. Following the revolution and the instability the country 
witnessed, the growth rate dropped dramatically in 2011. 
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Figure 5Unemployment rates compared to those in Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s era, reached the double digits 
despite the improvement of certain sectors in Egypt such as the telecoms and service sectors. Following the 
revolution of 2011 and the current instability the country is witnessing, unemployment stands at around 
13%, affecting mostly those between 15 and 29, who account for 90%of the unemployment in the 
country.
14
 
 
 
 
Figure 6We can observe a definite persistent negative trend between g (%) and τ between 1990 and 2012. 
(Source: the Egyptian Government Finance Statistics and the World Development Indicators.) 
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Figure 7The education spending share is almost constant despite its negative linear trend in the graph over 
the period from 1990 to 2012.Data comes from the Egyptian Government Finance Statistics. (Source: 
Central Government Budget) 
 
 
IMPORTANT DERIVATIONS 
 
Using the following equations: 
- The Cobb-Douglas production function; 𝑦 = 𝐴𝐺𝑘
𝛼 (𝑙𝐺ℎ )
1−𝛼 , 
- The balanced growth path of the economy with respect to the output to 
physical capital ratio; 𝛾 = 𝛽[ 1 − 𝜏  𝛼
𝑦
𝑘
 + 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝑘), 
We can get the value of the three ratios mentioned in Section II of this paper. The time 
subscripts have been taken out to display a stationary analysis of the economy along the 
balanced long-run growth path.  
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o To get the value of the output to physical capital ratio, we use the balanced 
growth path with respect to the aforementioned ratio; 
𝛾 = 𝛽[ 1 − 𝜏  𝛼
𝑦
𝑘
 + 𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝑘) 
𝛾 − 𝛽 1 − 𝛿𝑘 = 𝛼𝛽 1 − 𝜏 
𝑦
𝑘
 
𝑦
𝑘 =  
𝛾
𝛽 −  1 − 𝛿𝑘 
 1 − 𝜏 𝛼
 
 
o To get the value of the output to human capital ratio, we use the Cobb-Douglas 
production function in its stationary form; 
 
𝑦 = 𝐴𝐺𝑘
𝛼(𝑙𝐺ℎ)
1−𝛼  (we divide by ℎ) 
𝑦
ℎ = 𝐴𝐺𝑘
𝛼 𝑙𝐺
1−𝛼 ℎ
1−𝛼
ℎ
 (seeing as how 𝑙𝐺 = 1 − 𝑙𝐻) 
𝑦
ℎ = 𝐴𝐺[(1 − 𝑙𝐻)
1−𝛼(𝑘 ℎ )
𝛼] 
 
o And finally, to get the last ratio of physical to human capital ratio, we once again 
use the Cobb-Douglas production function in its stationary form; 
𝑦 = 𝐴𝐺𝑘
𝛼(𝑙𝐺ℎ)
1−𝛼  (we divide by 𝑘) 
𝑦
𝑘 = 𝐴𝐺𝑘
𝛼−1(𝑙𝐺)
1−𝛼ℎ1−𝛼  
𝑦
𝑘 = 𝐴𝐺(𝑙𝐺)
1−𝛼(
ℎ
𝑘
)1−𝛼  
(
𝑘
ℎ
)𝛼−1 =
𝐴𝐺(𝑙𝐺)
1−𝛼
𝑦
𝑘
 (we take the inverse of this equation) 
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(
𝑘
ℎ
)1−𝛼 =
𝑦
𝑘 
𝐴𝐺(𝑙𝐺)1−𝛼
 (we take it to the power of (1 1 − 𝛼 ) 
𝑘
ℎ = [
𝑦
𝑘
𝐴𝐺(𝑙𝐺)1−𝛼
]
1
1−𝛼  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
